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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals properly has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (2) (k) 
(1994) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. After a hearing during which it considered and found 
disparate interests among all of the parties, was it proper for 
the trial court to allow each of the parties an equal number of 
separate peremptory challenges for selecting the jury at trial 
in this case? 
Since the court's decision was based on a finding of 
fact with respect to the parties' disparate interests, the 
applicable standard of review regarding the Court's decision on 
this issue is an abuse of discretion standard. Margulies by 
Marcrulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). 
2. Based on all of the evidence presented at trial, was 
it proper for the trial court to enter judgment on the jury 
verdict in this case, with respect to the alleged negligence of 
Pleasant Grove City? 
In reviewing jury verdicts, the appellate court reviews 
evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the jury 
and upholds its verdict so long as there is competent evidence 
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to sustain it. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 
P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991) . 
3. Was it proper for the trial court to give a right-
of-way instruction which incorporated language from an 
applicable Utah state statute, and refuse to limit the 
language of the instruction to incorporate only plaintiff's 
theory of the facts in this case? 
The applicable standard of review on this issue is the 
correctness standard. Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc., v. 
11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
4. After plaintiff had introduced the testimony of 
accident reconstruction expert Newell Knight at trial, was it 
proper for the trial court to allow Mr. Knight to testify 
regarding his expert opinions? 
The applicable standard of review on this issue is an 
abuse of discretion standard. Whitehead v. American Motors 
Sales Corporation, 801 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1992). 
2. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-72 (1992). 
3. Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1992). 
4. Rule 611 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1992). 
5. Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1994). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's Statement of the Case is accurate with the 
following additions: 
1. In addition to denying their own negligence and 
asserting comparative negligence on the part of Ms. Carrier in 
their Answers to Ms. Carrier's Complaint, each defendant also 
asserted that the accident was caused or contributed to by the 
actions of third parties. (R. 13, 52, 59) 
2. Although the trial schedule, as laid out by 
appellant, is accurate, it should be noted that counsel for Ms. 
Carrier had represented to the trial court in a pre-trial 
conference that the entire trial would require only one week. 
Despite warnings by the trial court to counsel regarding the 
consequences of going over the requested six days, by the end 
of one week, Ms. Carrier's counsel had not finished putting on 
plaintiff's case in chief. Thus, the trial court was required 
to schedule the remainder of the trial as best it could with 
the earliest dates available. (R. 2098, 2177, 2401, 2528-29) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Initially, it should be noted, with respect to 
appellant's "Statement of Facts," that Ms. Carrier's counsel 
has made assertions which are inaccurate and misleading with 
reference to the transcript citations. Counsel has taken undue 
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liberties by going beyond the actual testimony contained in the 
transcript. 
Thus, in addition to objecting to many of the statements 
contained in appellant's "Statement of Facts," appellee hereby 
submits the following: 
1. On January 15, 1991, William Roger Smith, driving a 
van for Pro-Tech Restoration, was traveling south on 500 East, 
and approaching 1100 North in Pleasant Grove, Utah. As he 
approached the intersection, he did not see any vehicles 
approaching 500 East from the east or west on 1100 North. He 
also did not see any stop sign for south bound traffic on 500 
East at the intersection of 1100 North. (R. 1477, 1486, 1494) 
2. After entering the intersection, he saw Ms. 
Carrier's vehicle coming fast toward him, and knew she would 
not be able to stop on the slushy road. The front of Ms. 
Carrier's vehicle collided with the passenger side of Mr. 
Smith's vehicle, approximately in the center. (R. 1489, 1493, 
1528) 
3. At the time of the accident, Smith was an individual 
working for Pro-Tech, a corporation involved in the business of 
restoring carpeting in homes following a flood. As of July 5, 
1991, approximately six months after the accident and prior to 
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any depositions in this case, Smith was not employed at all by 
Pro-Tech. (R. 1294, 1365) 
4. On or about January 7, 1992, Ms. Carrier filed suit 
against William Roger Smith, Pro-Tech Restoration and Pleasant 
Grove City for causing her alleged injuries, and had each 
individually served. (R. 6, 19, 45, 127) 
5. In response to the Complaint filed against 
defendants in this case, William Roger Smith prepared his own 
handwritten response. Answers to the Complaint were also 
prepared by counsel for Pleasant Grove City and Pro-Tech 
Restoration, denying their own liability, and asserting 
comparative fault on behalf of Ms. Carrier and third parties. 
(R. 13, 52, 59, 1295, 1556-57) 
6 . Although the attorney representing Pro-Tech 
Restoration briefly attempted to simultaneously represent 
Smith and Pro-Tech in this matter, it was discovered very early 
on that there existed a substantial controversy between Smith 
and Pro-Tech, requiring that they retain separate counsel to 
represent their disparate interests in this case. One of the 
significant facts contributing to this substantial controversy 
between Smith and Pro-Tech was that Smith alleged Pro-Tech 
Restoration, as Smith's employer, was putting pressure on him 
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to lie regarding the circumstances of the accident. (R. 1295-
1301, 1312, 1515-21) 
7. During the discovery and the course of the trial, 
Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted to establish a separate claim 
against Pro-Tech based on some sort of negligent hiring or 
training theory. Indeed, it was not until all the evidence was 
in, that the trial court found there was not sufficient 
evidence to support such claims against Pro-Tech as 
distinguished from its responsibility for Smith's alleged 
negligence. (R. 1462-63, 1610-15, 1802-1803, 1807-13, 2507, 
2521-22) 
8. Subsequent to the accident, a neighbor near the 
subject intersection in Pleasant Grove testified that he 
believed the stop sign for the south bound traffic on 500 East 
was missing at the time of the accident, but said that the time 
it had been missing was "no more than a day or so." The 
accident occurred on a Tuesday, and this witness testified that 
he did not recall Monday, but could "fairly reasonably say" he 
knew "Tuesday it was down." (R. 1706-1709) 
9. On the day prior to the subject accident, an 
employee for Pleasant Grove City was out snowplowing and 
cindering the roads in the city generally. However, he had no 
recollection, and there is no evidence, that he actually 
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travelled the roads through the intersection which is at issue 
in this case. Further, he did not notice, and there is no 
evidence, that the subject stop sign was down at the time he 
was plowing and cindering the roads generally in the city. 
(R. 1890-95, 1935) 
10. The testimony from city employees was that they 
were expected to be alert for road signs that were knocked 
down, and ideally hoped that such signs would be identified 
within minutes or hours. However, the city employees and an 
expert traffic engineer testified that they would not consider 
the city's system as having failed or fallen below the required 
standard of care, unless it could be shown that the sign had 
been down for "a number of days." There was no evidence 
presented to the jury at trial in this case that the subject 
stop sign had been down for "a number of days." (R. 1432, 
1440, 1818-1820, 1846-48, 1854-55, 1863, 1869, 1876-78, 1935, 
1978, 1981, 2010, 2248-50, 2265-72) 
11. Prior to the trial of this case, Ms. Carrier's 
counsel filed a motion to limit the number of defendants' 
peremptory challenges. Counsel for each defendant filed 
memoranda in opposition to plaintiff's motion, setting forth 
the facts and legal arguments supporting the position that each 
party should be allowed an equal number of peremptory 
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challenges for the selection of the jury in this case. The 
Court was specifically made aware of the separate and different 
interests of each defendant in selecting a jury and shifting 
the ultimate responsibility for the accident on the other 
parties involved, and that significant adverse interests 
between Smith and Pro-Tech Restoration had required those two 
defendants to retain separate counsel. (R. 381, 483, 489, 518) 
12. Also prior to trial, counsel for Pro-Tech filed a 
Motion in Limine to Exclude Smith's Prior Inconsistent 
Statements regarding the circumstances of the accident. 
Counsel for Pro-Tech argued to the court that Smith's 
statements would be used, not to impeach Smith, but to 
discredit Pro-Tech. (R. 529) 
13. After a hearing at which he considered the degree 
of adversity among the defendants, based on the memoranda 
opposing Ms. Carrier's motion and based on his familiarity with 
the issues raised during the pre-trial phase of this case, the 
Court found interests "disparate enough" to justify giving each 
party an equal number of peremptory challenges with which to 
select the jury. (Exhibit 2 to Appellant's Brief, Transcript 
July 15, 1993). 
14. On the first day of trial, while impaneling the 
jury, the Court asked that each party read the names of its 
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witnesses to the potential jurors. Although each defendant had 
a separate list of witnesses, counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration 
consolidated the lists into one for the purposes of presenting 
the names to the potential jurors. The parties, including 
plaintiff, had listed "any witnesses listed by any other party" 
as potential witnesses for their case. (R. 132, 137, 1164-66) 
15. In opening statements, during the trial, and in 
closing, Ms. Carrier's counsel emphasized the theme of conflict 
and disparate interests between Smith and Pro-Tech Restoration, 
along with Pleasant Grove City. That is a theme that ran 
throughout Ms. Carrier's presentation of her case regarding the 
issue of liability. Indeed, Ms. Carrierfs counsel, in 
referring back to his opening and all evidence discovered prior 
to trial and presented during the trial, described the conflict 
and accusations of lying between defendants as the "paramount 
issue" in this case. (R. 1295-1301, 1312, 1515-21, 1537, 1561-
64, 1808, 1822, 1824-28, 2555, 2559, 2573-74, 2734) 
16. Prior to trial, Pleasant Grove City retained the 
services of Newell Knight as an accident reconstruction expert. 
Pro-Tech Restoration retained the services of Thomas Blotter as 
its accident reconstruction expert. Smith did not retain the 
services of a third accident reconstruction expert. (R. 132, 
137, 356) 
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17. Counsel for Ms. Carrier took the deposition of 
Newell Knight, and cross-examined him extensively regarding 
his opinions and the bases for such. In addition, counsel for 
Pro-Tech questioned Mr. Knight in his deposition regarding his 
opinion of whether Smith entered the intersection first, and 
what that would mean in terms of right-of-way, given his 
understanding and experience with the Utah Traffic Code. (R. 
1075, pp. 81-82) 
18. At trial, counsel for Pleasant Grove, which had 
retained Mr. Knight, elected not to call him as a witness; 
therefore, counsel for Ms. Carrier requested the opportunity to 
read to the jury portions of Newell Knight's cross-examination 
from his deposition transcript. Counsel for Pro-Tech 
Restoration objected to the reading of the deposition and to 
Newell Knight's testimony. The Court allowed Ms. Carrier's 
counsel to present Newell Knight's deposition testimony to the 
jury, but required, since he was available and ready to 
testify, that Newell Knight take the stand as a witness. Ms. 
Carrier's counsel then proceeded to have Newell Knight testify 
extensively from his deposition with respect to his cross-
examination. Counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration then questioned 
Mr. Knight, as had been done in the deposition, regarding his 
opinion of whether Smith entered the intersection first, and 
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what that would mean in terms of right-of-way, given his 
understanding and experience with the Utah Traffic Code. (R. 
2403-2404, 2439, 2457, 2473, 2477, 1075, pp. 81-82) 
19. Ms. Carrier's counsel objected to Mr. Knight's 
testimony regarding his opinions, stating that such was beyond 
the scope of his "direct examination". However, the court 
explained that it had granted all parties examination outside 
the scope of either cross or direct throughout the trial, and, 
since Mr. Knight was there available to testify, he did not 
feel it necessary to impose the formality of limiting his 
testimony. Mr. Knight had been called as an expert, duly 
qualified, and testified within the scope of that expertise. 
(R. 2525) 
20. Ms. Carrier's own accident reconstruction expert, 
Rudy Limpert, was also allowed to testify regarding his opinion 
on the right-of-way issue between Smith and Ms. Carrier. (R. 
1760) 
21. With regard to jury instructions proposed prior to 
trial, counsel for Pro-Tech proposed an instruction on right-
of-way, containing the verbatim language from U.C.A. §41-6-
72(1) and (2). However, counsel for Ms. Carrier objected, 
requesting the court to limit the instruction to the language 
of subsection (2) only. Counsel for Pleasant Grove proposed an 
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instruction from MUJI, which paraphrases the language from both 
subsections. (R. 560, 558, 620, 597, 683, 646) 
22. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court 
used the MUJI instruction suggested by counsel for Pleasant 
Grove and instructed the jury regarding the law, as paraphrased 
from Utah Code Annotated §41-6-72(1) and (2), without assuming 
the existence of any controverted issue of fact in favor of any 
party. Ms. Carrier's counsel admitted that, "in essence, [his] 
instruction was given" as part of Instruction #31, and that the 
instruction "combines both of the potentially applicable 
statutes into one." Counsel was also permitted to argue his 
view point on the instruction in closing. (R. 781, Instruction 
#31, attached as Exhibit 3 to Appellant's Brief; R. 2533, 2538, 
2586-88) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court, after a hearing at which it considered 
the degree of adverseness among the defendants, correctly found 
that the defendants' interests were "disparate enough" to 
justify giving each party an equal number of peremptory 
challenges for selecting the jury in this case. Since the 
trial court's decision to grant each party an equal number of 
peremptory challenges was based on a finding of fact regarding 
the degree of adverseness among the defendants, this decision 
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can only be upset on appeal upon a showing by appellant that 
the trial court abused its discretion. In this case, Ms. 
Carrier cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion 
in finding sufficient adverseness among the parties to justify 
allowing each party an equal number of peremptory challenges. 
The plain language of Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that "each party" is entitled to three 
peremptory challenges. The qualifying language in subsection 
(c) of Rule 47, regarding multiple parties on "either side," 
was previously defined by the Utah Supreme Court to mean that 
co-parties are not deemed to be on the same side of a lawsuit 
if it is found "their interests are truly adverse." Since the 
trial court, after considering all of the particular 
circumstances in this case, found that the defendants' 
interests were sufficiently adverse, it was not an abuse of 
discretion to allow each party an equal number of peremptory 
challenges for selecting the jury. The decision by the trial 
court was consistent with the language of Rule 47, and the 
controlling Utah Supreme Court opinion interpreting the rule. 
Further, the existence or absence of a cross-claim 
between defendants is not the sole and controlling factor as to 
whether a "substantial controversy" exists, sufficient to 
warrant allowing each party separate peremptory challenges. 
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Indeed, in the present case, where, despite the absence of 
actual cross-claims being filed, significant factors existed 
giving rise to a "substantial controversy" between the 
defendants, it was proper for the court, after considering the 
degree of adverseness among the parties, to allow each party an 
equal number of peremptory challenges for selecting the jury. 
Ms. Carrier's counsel admitted that Pleasant Grove City 
had sufficient disparate interests to warrant separate 
challenges. In addition, much of the emphasis by Ms. 
Carrier's counsel in pre-trial discovery and during the 
presentation of evidence at trial was on the existence of a 
conflict or controversy between the other two defendants, Pro-
Tech and Smith, regarding allegations of lying with respect to 
critical facts in the case. Indeed, at trial, making reference 
to evidence found through pre-trial discovery and allegedly 
demonstrated through the testimony presented at trial, Ms. 
Carrier's counsel himself described the issue of conflict and 
controversy among the defendants as the "paramount issue" in 
this case. 
Since each of the defendants in this case had unique 
interests in the type of jury to be selected, due to 
"substantial controversies" between them, it was fair and not 
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an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow each party 
the same opportunity to select jurors. 
With respect to the jury's verdict regarding Pleasant 
Grove City's alleged negligence, such was supported by 
sufficient competent evidence at trial, and therefore must be 
upheld on appeal. Ms. Carrier failed to marshal the evidence, 
as required for a proper appeal of the jury's verdict, and 
therefore the Court should summarily affirm the jury's verdict 
regarding Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence in this 
case. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by a complete marshaling 
of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict regarding 
Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence, there was more than 
sufficient competent evidence supporting the verdict, and hence 
the jury's verdict must stand. In short, the testimony and 
evidence presented at trial is more than sufficient for a jury 
to reasonably conclude that the city's actions were within the 
acceptable standard of care for discovering and replacing 
downed stop signs, as testified to by all experts at trial, 
including Ms. Carrier's own expert. 
With respect to the jury instruction given by the Court 
regarding the right-of-way between drivers approaching an 
intersection, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the 
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jury based on the language of the applicable statute in the 
Utah Traffic Code, without regard to any party's version of a 
controverted fact. Considering the language of the right-of-
way instruction given, and the instructions given as a whole, 
it cannot be said that Ms. Carrier was refused the opportunity 
to have her theory of the case submitted to the jury. Instead, 
it was proper for the trial court to refuse to assume the 
existence of a controverted fact in favor of any party, and 
instead give an instruction to the jury incorporating the law 
from both potentially applicable provisions of the statute 
regarding right-of-way at intersections. Since Ms. Carrier has 
failed to show that any confusion resulted from the right-of-
way instruction given, or that any alleged confusion from the 
instruction was substantial and prejudicial, her claim of error 
regarding the instruction must be rejected. 
Finally, following Ms. Carrier's introduction of Newell 
Knight's testimony into the trial, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to allow Mr. Knight to testify 
regarding his expert opinions, and the bases thereof. Prior to 
trial, counsel for Ms. Carrier deposed Newell Knight, at which 
time counsel for Pro-Tech questioned him regarding his opinion 
of whether Smith entered the intersection first, and would 
therefore have the right-of-way based on Mr. Knight's 
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understanding and experience with the Utah Traffic Code. 
Nevertheless, with knowledge that Mr. Knight had testified in 
his deposition that it was his opinion Smith was in the 
intersection first and would therefore have the right-of-way, 
counsel for Ms. Carrier chose to call Mr. Knight and introduce 
the cross-examination from his deposition. By choosing to 
introduce Newell Knight's testimony, Ms. Carrier chose to take 
the risk that Mr. Knight would testify the same as in his pre-
trial deposition regarding his conclusions and opinions, in 
addition to the bases for such. Since Ms. Carrier cannot show 
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. 
Knight to be questioned and testify regarding his expert 
opinion, the trial court's judgment should not be disturbed by 
this court on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT THE ADVERSENESS BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS 
WARRANTED GIVING EACH PARTY AN EQUAL 
NUMBER OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court's decision to grant each party an equal 
number of peremptory challenges in this case was not based on a 
"misreading of Rule 47," as claimed by appellant in her brief, 
but rather based on a finding of fact regarding the degree of 
adverseness between defendants, thus requiring the Court to 
apply Rule 4 7 as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Sutton 
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v. Otis, 249 P. 437 (Utah 1926), and followed by the Court in a 
decision decided subsequent to this case. Randle v. Allen, 862 
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). Under such circumstances, the appellate 
court applies an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the 
trial court's decision. Marcrulies by Maraulies v. Upchurch, 
696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985) 
Appellant's claim that the trial court erred in 
allowing each party an equal number of peremptory challenges in 
this case is based on three arguments which failed for reasons 
explained below. 
First, Ms. Carrier argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to comply with Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. However, it should initially be pointed out that 
the plain language of Rule 47(e) provides that "each party" is 
entitled to three peremptory challenges. In addition, 
appellant's argument fails to recognize that the qualifying 
language in subsection (c) of Rule 47, regarding multiple 
parties on "either side," had been previously defined by the 
Utah Supreme Court to mean that co-parties are not deemed to be 
on the same side of a lawsuit if it is found their "interests 
are truly adverse." Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 
1993) (citing Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85, 141, 249 P. 437, 457-
58 (1926).) 
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""•-- present case, the trial court thus did not 
misinterpret Rule 4 7 of the I It ah Ri lies of Civil Pxocedure, but 
r atl - L :.\ciu-..- act i ial fi nd i rig r egarding the adverseness of the 
parties, and then correctly =;;. iied th- existing standard, 
based on that i±ndin~ 101 anu1.' " :c-arr ^  --<=y~-
challenges, as directed i_y the Utah ^^pieme Coui . ..^ ..^x 
c o m : in rr/.u ca.c e heard argument: ' "cunsel, and had the 
benr ^  - ?repf ;:. nl 11 it 
diriereni aetendan.o were "disparate enougn" to considei each 
parties c\ separate "sides." "hereby warranting the 
challenges for th selection of the i : > , pursuant to the 
language of Pul^ &" ^nd th Q controlling ^ o r e m e •'"'•'•Tt opinion. 
_*- _ erred in 
granting each part * an equal :,amrr-; * peremptory challenges 
since nc -ross-claims hid been fi.l^d "in t-hin case. Appellant 
bases • alienage in I tie Handle opinion, stating 
that a "substantial controversy" exists when a party on one 
side of a lawsuit has a cross claim against a co-party. 
Howe ) ei
 # appel 1 ai it' 3 i: el iai l ze • : i I ti i<= J : i ^ .. •" • 1 .". .-...ju-igc L . Lhe 
Randle opinion :c displaced since the Court: die :ci say that 
the absence c^ a ^xied cross-claim is the sole ana concron 
._.ipr a . jDstarc^ controversy" exists > 
say that a "substantial controversy" exists when a party has a 
cross-claim against a co-party is not the equivalent of saying 
that a "substantial controversy" cannot exist when no cross-
claims are filed. In other words, although a cross-claim is 
one factor indicating a "substantial controversy" sufficient to 
justify separate peremptory challenges, it is certainly not the 
sole and controlling factor, and the absence of such is not 
determinative on the issue. 
The reason the Court in Randle focused on the fact that 
UDOT and the County had not filed cross-claims against each 
other in that case was that no other factors existed, as they 
do in the present case, demonstrating a "substantial 
controversy" or disparate interests between the two defendants 
in selecting a jury. Thus, in the present case, where, despite 
the absence of actual cross-claims being filed, significant 
factors existed giving rise to a "substantial controversy" 
between the defendants, it was proper for the Court, after 
considering the degree of adverseness among the parties, to 
allow each party an equal number of peremptory challenges for 
selecting the jury. 
Third, Ms. Carrier claims that defendants lacked a 
"substantial controversy" sufficient to warrant the trial 
court's allowance of an equal number of peremptory challenges 
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to each party. In support of this argument, Ms. Carrier claims 
that defendants never offered any fa"t_s demonstrate ng a 
substantial c • : i 11::i : o ai .
 : . •_ - .-. -.*•. ' i: ip] y i 1 :)t: ti ue . 
The facts demonstrating the defendants' disparate interests 
were before the Court several t i mes prior to tri al, and were 
l ..*... .1 ed by 1:1 le Cc»i 11: t at tl le time of the hearing 
held prior to aeny.r-g Ms. Carrier's motion to limit the number 
ui challenges allowed to defendants, "he •^ -•:-- — -^-h-^r^n 
arguments from ail parties regarding dista.iate ..Pereses, ana 
whether such were sufficient to award -x :h party an equal 
number r -"»•* . - - Sutton ^st, 
latei icxxowea anc appliec the Supreme Jcuii: . r> Randie v. 
Alien, supra. 
the attempL J a m e x • s counsel, . footnote to her 
brief ro side-ster ihe prior admission 'Appellant !s Brief, 
that .. Carrier'^ counsel conceded ana . .i no:, dispute i.nat 
Pleasant Crove C:*y had sufficient disoarat- :nterests 
.-epai :* •• .?;iie^ .g-::.::- o--*-.. . • . • ^ U - . 
Briei Transcript July :':. , \y?. \ -ijaicic ne Court 
indicates that -~ ;iad considered ~he "-sue and felt the 
. :.L*. :r;o:.::, " -.'. J-iI. .<\r. " " i ^ U a . : . . ) : ^ . } c .1 1 
equal number of peremptory challenges for each party. Id. At 
trial, making reference to evidence found through pre-trial 
discovery, Ms. Carrier's counsel himself described the issue 
of conflict and controversy among all the defendants as the 
"paramount issue" in this case. (R. 2555) 
Since it may always be said that all defendants have a 
common interest in shifting comparative fault to the plaintiff 
or plaintiffs in any given case, the focus needs to be on 
whether a "substantial controversy" exists between the parties 
giving rise to different interests in selecting a jury. If 
each of the defendants has a unique interest in the type of 
jury they would like to have seated due to disparate interests 
or "substantial controversies" between them, then it is only 
fair that they each should have the same opportunity as the 
plaintiff to select jurors and attempt to seat the type of jury 
from whom they each believe they would obtain the best result. 
See Randle v. Allen, 862 P. 2d at 1333, where the court based 
its decision, in part, on the fact that "Allen's interest in 
choosing jurors aligned him with both plaintiff and the other 
defendants." (Emphasis added) 
In Randle, UDOT and the County did not have separate 
interests in selecting a jury. They were not at odds and 
accusing each other of lying, as were Smith and Pro-Tech in the 
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present case. They were both governmental entities and had 
identical interests, not only :: defending against plaintiff's 
c J a:i iiis 1: i, i t a ] , = • : :I - : • - • . - • • •< - ,:,: .-.; f Q1 • u ]L = 
j urors t o 1 lave . 
Ir. contrast- Smith and ?ro-T^rr * - * te present case not 
* / accusing 
each other or lying regarding critical r *s ir. * he case, but 
also had very different ^nt,erests ~'^  *" • °r>ecific attitudes 
tii-} . . _ is a corporate 
employer, c-aimin:: to have been subject to lies i 
disgruntled former employee-driver. Sm. " 
.. ..i" :L -::.r y —.. . - Aiming to have been prejoui^j ^ y .Lz> former 
employer to lie regarding the circumstances of the accident. 
Under sue: - .v 
disparate interests , , J^V.:.!.^ w.. ^io.:~ . ndeed, 
was the existence of such disparate interests and "substantial 
•*"rtroversy" that i eauired separate i epresental :. i : • : • f • = a i : 1 l ] : y 
-liferent counsel. Further, the record reflects that Ms. 
Carrier's own strategy :: trial sought to emphasize the 
significant cc * •^^.-••*..-c Indeed, Ms. 
Carrier's nounsux •uMuiizca i^n^ . Losing by stating 
that this was the "paramount issue" in this case. (R. 2555) 
T " : i :ii j: 1:: : f t:l I = ] :i i i 1:::1 :i :ii 3 
case further illustrate the emphasis by Ms. Carrier's counsel 
on the theme of conflict among the defendants, including 
repeated accusations of lying and manipulating evidence on the 
part of all defendants: 
Smith cancelled his original deposition in 
order to retain his own separate counsel due to 
significant hostility and conflict between 
himself and his former employer, Pro-Tech. 
(R. 1295-1301, 1312) 
Counsel for Pro-Tech moved for a mistrial 
due to Ms. Carrier's counsel's focus on the 
controversy between Pro-Tech and Smith during his 
opening statement. (R. 1325-27) 
Counsel for Pro-Tech, in his opening 
statement, reacted to the theme of conflict and 
disparate interests between Smith and Pro-Tech, 
and pointed out that it was probably designed to 
help Smith only at Pro-Tech's expense. (R. 13 63-
66) 
Counsel for Smith also dealt with the 
conflict issue between Smith and Pro-Tech in his 
opening statement. (R. 13 74) 
Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted to establish 
a separate negligent hiring theory as to Pro-
Tech, based on its failure to check Smith's 
driving record. (R. 1462-63, 1610-15, 1802-1803, 
1807-13) 
Ms. Carrier's counsel brought out on 
examination of Smith his allegation of being 
instructed by the principals of Pro-Tech to lie 
regarding how the accident happened. Counsel for 
Pro-Tech was surprised by some of Smith's 
testimony. (R. 1515-21) 
The theme of conflict was extensively 
brought out during Smith's testimony, including 
emphasis on the fact that Smith had filed his own 
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Answer, and made inconsistent prior statements 
after allegedly being directed by Pro-Tech 
principals to lie regarding the circumstances of 
the accident. Ms. Carrier's counsel displayed 
these prior statements to the -^ •*~" ~n an overhead 
projector during examination.
 v-. 1524-1562, 
1537, 1552, 1556-57, 1561-64) 
Counsel for Ms. Carrier emphasized the theme 
of dishonesty between Smith and Pro-Tech during 
examination of one of the principals for Pro-
Tech. (R. 1808, 1822, 1824-28) 
The co'ui t did i lot conclude, until after all 
evidence was in, that no evidence suppoi ted the 
separate claim that Pro-Tech acted negligently, 
independent of Smith's actions, in causing the 
accident. It was only at that point that Ms. 
Carrier's counsel argued that there was no more 
need for separate representation of Pro-Tech. 
(R. 2507, 2521-22) 
Counsel for Pro-Tech argued that he took 
exception to the court's Instruction #14 since he 
said it: lumped the defendants together and gave 
the jury the wrong impression as to the dichotomy 
between defendants. (R, 2540) 
The conflict ii I lying between Pro-Tech and 
Smith was referred to by Ms. Carrier's counsel in 
closing as the "paramount issue" in this case. 
In that regard, he identified the "finger 
pointing" between Pro-Tech and Smi th as 
significant: (R. 2555, 2559, 2573-74) 
Counsel for Pro-Tech discussed the lying 
accusations between Pro-Tech and Smith in his 
closing. (R 2677-78) 
Counsel for Smith, during his closing, also 
discussed the conflict between Pro-Tech and 
Smith, requiring him to be hired as separate 
counsel early on in this case. (R. 2698-99) 
Finally, it is misleading for appellant to say that the 
defendants in Randle received only four additional challenges. 
In Randle, all three defendants were awarded separate 
challenges for a total of 12, and four total to plaintiff. The 
Court's holding in Randle was that, since there was no showing 
of a "substantial controversy" between UDOT and the County, the 
three defendants should have been allowed only two sets of 
peremptory challenges, for a total of eight, compared to the 
four awarded to plaintiff. 
In the present case, "substantial controversies" existed 
between all three defendants, thus warranting an equal number 
of peremptory challenges for each party in selecting the jury. 
Counsel for Ms. Carrier has admitted that he "clearly will not 
dispute Pleasant Grove City has disparate interests," which is 
not surprising given the fact that Pro-Tech Restoration and 
Smith aligned with plaintiff in their adverseness to Pleasant 
Grove City. Ms. Carrier, Pro-Tech and Smith all claimed that 
the accident, at least in part, was caused by the City's 
alleged negligence in failing to notice and/or replace the 
downed stop sign. (R. 1842-44, 2680-81, 1370-74) In addition, 
as previously discussed, Smith and Pro-Tech not only had the 
"substantial controversy" between them of accusing each other 
of lying regarding critical facts in the case, but also had 
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very different interests with respect to the type of jurors to 
be selected. 
= .3 : 
considering L:^ degree _.i adverseness between ail -_: he 
parties, found that the i nterests were "disparate enough11 *- •-
just: fy a ] ] o ;/\n i lg sa zh p. . iial i n n tibez: :: f peren ip . 
challenges fcr the process of selecting t.:e jury _n this case. 
The finding * sufficient adverseness by the trial c n u r '-'as 
-or*-3'"^ -.. xo- i. i - -ler y.:.-.nt 
entered en tn- ury ;J veraicu .:.- ase should oe affirmed. 
l x - SINCE THE J D R Y ^ v^iiDICT REGARDING 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE 
WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, THE JURY'S FINDING 
MUST BE UPHELD. 
Initia 11 y, i t should be noted that appe 11 ant" s statement: 
tl lat the j ur } reached its verdict regarding Pleasant Grove 
City's alleged negligence, "in spite -: -stimony by Pleasant 
Gr nv^ employees *- r ~ the City had f aiie-" si rnp] \ r not tin le . 
^dbd. -_- .ty employee so test-i. .
 A. I '"uither, at the 
outset, . should ,oe noted that appellai • has misstated the 
standard for reviev:ina ^'irv verdicts as it;;;ring "si lbstai It:i a ] 
e vidence." i \ lthough there was substantia_ evidence presented 
at trial supporting the jury s verdict, the standard is not one 
of "substantial evider. ~- » -- * r*e. Instead, 
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the Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that a jury verdict 
will be upheld on appeal "so long as there is competent 
evidence to sustain it." Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc. , 808 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1991) . In the present case, 
there was more than sufficient competent evidence to sustain 
the jury's verdict regarding Pleasant Grove City's alleged 
negligence. 
Under Utah law, in order to find a party liable under a 
theory of negligence, it must be found that a duty of 
reasonable care was owed to the party seeking recovery, that 
there was a breach of that duty, and that such breach was a 
proximate cause of the injuries claimed by the party seeking 
recovery. In appealing the jury's finding regarding Pleasant 
Grove City's alleged negligence in this case, Ms. Carrier bears 
the heavy burden of being required to marshal "every scrap" of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
jury's verdict, and then demonstrating fatal flaws in all of 
that evidence. Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P. 2d 
1051, 1052 (Utah App. 1994). 
In Oneida, the Utah Court of Appeals further explained 
the requirement of marshaling the evidence, and the 
consequences for failing to do so, as follows: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial 
courts' factual findings lightly. We repeatedly 
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have set forth the heavy burden appellants must 
bear when challenging factual findings. To 
successfully appeal a trial court•s finding of 
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. "[Attorneys] must extri c a t e 
[themselves] from, the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists." ... 
This i igorous standard reiiccL^ die doctrine 
that appellate courts "do not sit ~^o retry cases 
submitted on disputed facts.' Accordingly, 
" [w] hen the duty to marshal is not properly 
discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the 
f indings as va1id " 
The deference we afford -,.,.• .rial courts' 
findings is based on and fosters the principle 
that traditional fact finders, whether judges or 
juries, are better equipped to consider, weigh, 
and assess the evidence that litigants bring 
before the courts 
When appellants iz no: marshal the evidence 
in support of z-' : findings, they place 
appellees or „espon_i^ncs in a precarious 
position In short, appellees are constrained 
to do the appellant's work, usually at 
considerable time and expense. When appellants 
challenge findings of fact, fairness requires 
that they bear the costs of demonstrating how the 
trial court found those facts from the evidence 
and why those findings contradict the weight of 
the evidence. 
1052-1054 (c:i tations omitted and emphasis added) . 
Ms. Carrier has failed to marshal the evidence, as 
required for a proper appeal of the jury's verdict regarding 
Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence in this case. Indeed, 
as was criticized and found insufficient by this Court in 
Oneida, Ms. Carrier has merely presented carefully selected 
facts and excerpts of trial testimony, which does not begin to 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict in this 
case, and does nothing more than slightly illustrate issues 
raised for the jury's determination at trial. Since Pleasant 
Grove City is unwilling to rely solely on its assertion that 
Ms. Carrier has failed to marshal the evidence, it has been 
compelled to do the appellant's work and perform the marshaling 
process at considerable time and expense. The evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict regarding the alleged negligence 
of Pleasant Grove City in this case is as follows: 
At the scene of the subject accident, as 
soon as officer Randy Shepherd received first 
notice that the stop sign was missing, the city 
workers were contacted immediately. They came 
right out and had a temporary stop sign put up at 
the intersection. (R. 1408) 
Officer Randy Shepherd testified that he 
keeps a lookout for downed stop signs without 
regard to what shift he may be working, 24 hours 
a day, 365 days a year. (R. 1432) 
Officer Shepherd did not know how long the 
subject stop sign had been down at the time of 
the accident. (R. 1440) 
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Onicer Shepherd testitied I. hat there was 
more snow and slush on 500 East than there was on 
1100 North {e could not recall observing 
whether ~n'~ .L^SL had even been plowed, (R. 1441, 
1444) 
Officer Shepherd said he probably did not 
patrol up 110 0 North during the day of the 
accident, until responding to the accident, 
because it was a busy day. Also, he says in 
early 1991, he would not have typically patrolled 
a dead-end street like 500 East. (R. 1447-48) 
Officer Shepherd observed the stump fi on i the 
broken stop sign at the scene of the accident, 
and said he did not recall it being covered with 
snow (R 1 44 8) 
William, Roger Smith did not recall being in 
ti le vicinity of the subject intersection prior to 
the day of the accident, and says it was only 
after the collision that he noticed that the stop 
sign, usually in place for south bound traffic on 
500 East, was missing. (R. 1470, VrSf, 1574-75) 
Arlen Shupe testified unat ^e did not 
believe 500 East had been plowed at the ti me of 
the accident (R ] 63 3) 
A witness and neighbor to the subject 
intersection, Mr, Holdaway, testified that his 
memory of the missing stop sign was "very vague," 
and that it was difficult for him "to say that it 
had been down any length of time." Mr. Holdaway 
testified tnat he traveled the street himself 
virtually every day, and did not recall the stop 
sign being down for any significant length of 
time, (R ] 706) 
Mr. Holdaway further testified that his 
recollection would be that the stop sign was down 
"not more than a day or so." The accident 
occurred on Tuesday, and Mr. Holdaway said "I 
wouldn't think it would have been down more than, 
say, Monday. " ' P ^ ~, o * 
Joe Stone, a principal of Pro-Tech 
Restoration, testified that he did not remember 
receiving any information from Roger Smith's wife 
or Arlen Shupe, after their interviews of several 
neighbors to the intersection, regarding how long 
the stop sign might have been down. (R. 1818-20) 
Pleasant Grove City's police chief testified 
that the city had seven patrolmen employed at the 
time of the accident. Further, he said that only 
one officer would be on duty in the whole city 
from 3 a.m. until 6:30 a.m., and that thereafter 
there is still just one officer on duty, but he 
can call on detectives or others for help. (R. 
1832, 1866) 
Pleasant Grove police officers were informed 
of their duty to keep a lookout for downed stop 
signs, and the city street department shared that 
responsibility. Pleasant Grove's police chief 
testified that he emphasized this in meetings at 
least once or twice a year, and that it was also 
part of their training. (R. 1846-47) 
The police chief testified that the officers 
keep a lookout for downed stop signs 24 hours a 
day as best they can, recognizing they have lots 
of other things to do. If a downed stop sign is 
noticed or reported, it is replaced immediately, 
even if it is in the middle of the night. (R. 
1848-49) 
The investigating officer and street 
department employees acted in conformity with 
this policy, once they were made aware of the 
missing stop sign in this case. (R. 1851) 
Pleasant Grove's police chief testified that 
he expected downed signs to be noticed and 
replaced "as soon as possible." If it were 
discovered that a sign had been down "for days," 
he would instruct the street department and 
officers to be more efficient. (R. 1854-55) 
The police chief did not know how long the 
stop sign had been down in this case. (R. 1863) 
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The police chief testified that: the Pleasant 
Grove police officers are required to respond to 
calls first. This makes general patrolling much 
less frequent on snowy days. During the day 
shifts, a lot of times, they are just x tinning 
from call to call. (R. 1864-66) 
The police chief testified that it would be 
very unlikely, in a 24 hour period, that an 
officer would pat re1 a dead end, street si ich as 
500 Easr R. 1867 
T^o .- ~, .xv_c: ^ix±ef, s exptntuL', ~ .* L „^  + 
years at Pleasant Grove was that the system for 
identifying downed signs has been very effective. 
He said that police officers have called several 
times within a given month regarding signs, and 
that they have also received periodic 
not i f i cat ions from c i t iz ens. {R ] 8 6 9) 
Dave Frye, the person in charge of signs 
witl i the Pleasant Grove Street Department, 
testified that he does an annual inventory of all 
signs in the city. He has done so for eight or 
nine years, and is very familiar with the signs 
in the city. He further testified that he kept a 
lookout for downed stop signs prior to the 
accident: (R 18 76-78) 
Dave Frye, also responsible for running a. 
snowplow for Pleasant Grove City, testified that 
they would always plow the streets around schools 
and other problem areas first. He said they 
would then plow collector and other main roads, 
and widen such, before moving on to other roads. 
(R. 1890-91) 
Dave Frye had . _ j ....-„•. iecci... . : - ^ w^n^ 
1100 North and 500 East on January :-, : r 15, 
1991. (R. 1 8 95) 
Dave Frye would usually plow other collector 
routes and problem areas before ever getting to 
110 0 North. He said he does not have to go 
through the subject intersection in order to get 
- 3 3 • 
to other collector routes or problem areas. (R. 
1918, 1921) 
Dave Frye testified that his routine for 
plowing the streets in the city is different 
every time. He also said he has to respond to 
calls in other parts of the whole city, as needed 
during any given day. (R. 1922, 1925) 
During the course of Dave Frye's testimony, 
the trial court sustained numerous objections by 
defendants on the basis that the testimony sought 
by plaintiff's counsel regarding how many times 
Mr. Frye may have been through the subject 
intersection was too speculative. (R. 1897, 
1910, 1919, 1927, 1931) 
Dave Frye testified that he had no idea how 
long the stop sign had been missing. (R. 1935) 
Dave Frye testified that he had never 
knocked over a stop sign in his experience of 
eight or nine years with the Pleasant Grove City 
Street Department, and was not aware of any other 
employees of the department ever knocking one 
down. (R. 1935) 
Dave Frye testified that he did not know 
what time he would have started plowing the roads 
in general on January 15, 1991. He said that, if 
it snowed for two or three days, he probably 
would never get all of the city streets done at 
any one time. There is always a part of his 
regular route he does not get to during a good 
snow storm. He said that dead-end streets such 
as 5 00 East are towards the bottom of his 
priority list. (R. 1936-37, 1942) 
Dennis Carter, head of the Pleasant Grove 
City Street Department, testified that he had no 
me^mory of doing any grading in Dave Frye' s 
plowing area on January 15, 1991. (R. 1954) 
Mr. Carter testified that no members of the 
city street crew have ever knocked over stop 
signs while plowing to his knowledge. (R. 1962) 
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Mr. Carter _._^ „„^ .*r .^ ^ the 
streets in Pleasant Grove City would have been 
plowed by the time he and his crew went home from 
work on January 15, 1991. He said that dead-end 
roads such as 500 East are the last thing plowed, 
and it is possible they could have forgotten some 
of them. This is affected by the amount and 
consistency of the snow that day. In that 
regard, it snowed all day long < Tanuaiy " ", 
] 99] ':;....-. 
Carter testified that, when you are 
dixViuy a snowplow, you're concentrating on the 
equipment and more than normal on other traffic, 
since you don't always stop. (R, 196 8) 
Pleasant Grove City Public Wci:ks Director, 
Mike Mills, testified that he wanes stop signs 
back up "as soon as possible," and that they all 
work together in the city to identify and replace 
downed or missing stop signs as soon as possible, 
24 hours a d^y, 365 days a year (R 1976, 1978) 
Mills said he expected that the system 
in place at ::he time of the accident would notify 
t hem "very s oon" after a s i gn wa s down ' ^  
1981) 
Mr. Mills said that, generally speaking, the 
subject intersection was not a busy one since it 
fed off a dead-end street, (R. 2 984) 
At the time of the accident, there were only 
three full time employees in the city street 
department, and they would have to borrow from 
other departments when they needed extra help. 
(R. 1 986-87) 
Mr. Mills testified that, in hi s nine years' 
experience with the city, people in Pleasant 
Grove have been very conscientious in calling 
regarding downed stop signs. He said they have 
received periodic notices from, bus drivers, 
police department, public works emp] oyees, and 
citizens. (R. 1988-89) 
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Mr. Mills testified that it had snowed all 
day January 15, 1991, and it was most likely that 
the street crew did not get to all the roads in 
the city. He said that, after 12 hours of 
plowing, they have to give the drivers 5 or 6 
hours break. Then they are back out by 10 or 11 
p.m. until early morning, and then back home to 
rest during the day. They can't expect drivers 
to plow more than 12 hours a day. (R. 1991-92) 
Ms. Carrier's expert, Bruce Reading, 
testified that his opinion of a city's role in 
providing a surveillance team for identifying 
downed signs was consistent with that described 
by the police chief as existing in Pleasant Grove 
at the time of the accident. He also admitted 
that the city "acted very well" once notice of 
the downed sign was actually received. (R. 2010, 
2014) 
Ms. Carrier's expert also admitted that 
there were no written standards specifying the 
amount of time a sign may be down before it 
should be discovered, and has never taught such a 
specific standard in road school. He admitted 
that a 24 hour standard would be acceptable. (R. 
2015-16) 
Highway safety and traffic engineer, Art 
Guerts, testified that Pleasant Grove City's 
system for locating and replacing downed stop 
signs is similar to other systems employed in the 
State of Utah in all respects. (R. 2248) 
Mr. Guerts testified that, based on the 
testimony of the stop sign being down no more 
than "a day or so, " and on the testimony 
regarding the possible times the city employees 
could have been through the intersection, it was 
his expert opinion that the city's conduct and 
that of its employees was within the acceptable 
standard of care for a city in maintaining stop 
signs. (R. 2248-50) 
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Mr. Guerts further testified that the system 
used in Pleasant Grove City was the best we have 
in an imperfect world. The system is no 
different than that utilized by Salt Lake City 
and the Department of Transportation. (R. 2250) 
Mr. Guerts disagreed with Frank Mills' 
testimony that the system would have failed if 
the sign had been missing unnoticed for two or 
three days. (R. 2265-67) 
Mr. Guerts explained that he did not 
disagree with the city's "hopes and aspirations" 
regarding how soon after they wanted to have 
downed stop signs noticed, but disagreed that 
minutes or hours instead of days was a reasonable 
expectation. (R. 2266-72) 
The jury verdict regarding the issue of 
Pleasant Grove City's alleged negligence was 
unanimous, with every juror finding that the 
evidence presented showed Pleasant Grove City was 
not negligent in this case. (R. 2764) 
Further, although there cannot be cites to the record 
regarding what was not shown, it should be noted that, often, 
the most important aspect to a trial is the absence of 
evidence, not the evidence produced. In this case, regarding 
the length of time the subject stop sign was down and the 
possible notice of such to the city, all Ms. Carrier had were 
possibilities, but no evidence that the sign was down for an 
unreasonable period. 
Since Ms. Carrier failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict, as demonstrated by the above 
examples from the record, this Court should summarily hold that 
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the jury's findings were supported by the evidence, and affirm 
the jury's verdict regarding Pleasant Grove City's alleged 
negligence in this case. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the above marshaling of 
the evidence, more than sufficient competent evidence supported 
the jury's verdict regarding Pleasant Grove City's alleged 
negligence, and hence the jury's verdict must stand. Rees v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., supra, at 1072. See also, 
Krauss v. Utah State Department of Transportation, 852 P.2d 
1014 (Utah App. 1993), where this Court stated that the 
evidence, and "all fair, reasonable inferences therefrom," must 
be viewed "in a light most favorable to the jury verdict." Id. 
at 1021. The Court, in Krauss, went on to note that: 
This court will not reverse a jury verdict 
on the basis of insufficient evidence "unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates for the appellant 
to the extent that reasonable people could not 
differ on the outcome of the case." 
Id. at 1021-22 (citations omitted). 
In the present case, Ms. Carrier has incorrectly stated 
that the evidence showed Pleasant Grove City's stop sign to be 
down "one to two days." As demonstrated by the above-marshaled 
evidence, there was testimony at trial from a neighbor to the 
intersection that the sign was not down "more than a day or 
so." From that testimony it would be entirely reasonable for 
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the jury to have believed that the sign went down within 24 
hours of the accident, and possibly on the same day, putting 
the City's actions within the acceptable standard of care 
testified to by all experts at trial, including Ms. Carrier's 
own expert. 
Ms. Carrier's assertion that the "clear weight" of the 
evidence was against the jury verdict is based on assumptions 
the jury clearly was not required to make from the testimony 
actually presented at trial. Two critical assumptions Ms. 
Carrier claims the jury should have been required to make based 
on the evidence were (1) that the subject stop sign was down 
more than one or two days, and (2) that Pleasant Grove City 
employees actually went through the intersection during a 
period when the stop sign was down prior to the subject 
accident. Since it was reasonable, based on all of the 
testimony and evidence presented at trial, for the jury to 
refuse to make the jump to either of those assumptions, there 
clearly existed sufficient competent evidence to sustain the 
jury's verdict of 0% negligence on the part of Pleasant Grove 
City in this case. 
Therefore, the Court should affirm the judgment entered 
on the jury's verdict for at least one of two reasons: First, 
Ms. Carrier failed to comply with the marshaling evidence 
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requirement as clearly established by this Court. Second, 
considering all of the evidence presented at trial, there was 
sufficient competent evidence to sustain a jury's verdict. 
III. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE RIGHT-OF-WAY 
ISSUE IN THIS CASE ACCORDING TO 
THE APPLICABLE UTAH STATUTES. 
Although a party is entitled to have his theory of the 
case submitted to the jury, a party is not necessarily entitled 
to have his version of an instruction given to the exclusion of 
a version requested by an opposing party. The trial court is 
required to instruct the jury on the applicable law in a clear 
and understandable way. However, it is not required to 
incorporate one party's theory of negligence into an 
instruction to the exclusion of another party's theory, 
especially when those theories are based on controverted issues 
of fact. See Olson v. R. L. Coats, 717 P.2d 176, 179 (Ore.App. 
1986), where the Court holds that "a jury instruction may not 
assume the existence of any controverted fact"; and Harris v. 
Groth, 645 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Wash.App. 1982), where the Court 
held that "instructions should not emphasize certain aspects of 
the case which might subject the trial judge to the charge of 
commenting on the evidence." 
In the present case, Ms. Carrier argues that the 
evidence at trial supports a finding that "she and defendant 
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Smith arrived at the intersection at approximately the same 
time," and that therefore, the trial court should have limited 
its right-of-way jury instruction to only subsection (2) of 
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-72. (Appellant's Brief, p. 25). 
However, limiting the jury instruction as requested by Ms. 
Carrier would have required the trial court to improperly 
assume the existence of a controverted fact, i.e. whether 
Smith's van entered the subject intersection clearly ahead of 
Ms. Carrier's vehicle, or whether their vehicles arrived at the 
intersection at approximately the same time. 
In reviewing the jury instructions, arguments were heard 
from all counsel regarding this right of way instruction. Ms. 
Carrier's counsel admitted that Instruction #31 to be given by 
the court, "in essence", contained his proposed instruction, 
and that it combined "both of the potentially applicable 
statutes into one". (R. 2529-30, 2533, 2538) 
The problem was that there existed a controverted fact 
as to whether Smith entered the intersection first, or whether 
he entered the intersection at approximately the same time as 
Ms. Carrier. The trial court properly refused to assume the 
existence of the controverted fact in favor of either party, 
and instead gave an instruction to the jury incorporating the 
law from both subsection (1) and subsection (2) of Utah Code 
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Annotated §41-6-72. The Court did not refuse to incorporate 
language from the applicable Utah statute favorable to Ms. 
Carrier's assumption of the controverted fact, but rather 
refused to exclude the language of the applicable Utah statute 
favorable to Mr. Smith's assumption of the controverted fact. 
The instruction given stated the applicable law accurately, and 
allowed the jury to decide for itself the factual issue of 
whether Mr. Smith entered the intersection clearly ahead of Ms. 
Carrier, or whether their vehicles entered the intersection at 
approximately the same time. 
Further, Ms. Carrier's counsel had ample opportunity to 
argue his case to the jury. Indeed, Ms. Carrier's counsel 
argued her viewpoint on Instruction #31 at length in closing 
argument. (R. 2586-88) The jury instructions are not the 
forum for an unrebutted argument involving a disputed issue of 
fact. Further, other instructions given by the trial court 
proposed plaintiff's theory of the case. (R. 812, 
Instructions Nos. 22, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30; R. 790, 786, 785, 
784, 783, 782) 
Thus, considering the subject instruction in the context 
of the instructions as a whole, it cannot be said that Ms. 
Carrier was refused the opportunity to have her theory of the 
case submitted to the jury. Instead, it was proper for the 
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trial court to give the right-of-way instruction, based on the 
applicable Utah law, without adopting either party's assumption 
of a disputed fact. 
In addition, Ms. Carrier has failed to show that any 
confusion resulted from the right-of-way instruction given, or 
that any alleged confusion from the instruction was substantial 
and prejudicial, as required to sustain a claim of error 
regarding the giving of an instruction. Ostler v. Albina 
Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App. 1989). Thus, 
Ms. Carrier's claim of error must be rejected, and the judgment 
entered on the jury verdict in this case should be affirmed. 
IV. FOLLOWING MS. CARRIER'S INTRODUCTION 
OF NEWELL KNIGHT'S TESTIMONY INTO THE TRIAL, 
IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW MR. KNIGHT TO 
TESTIFY REGARDING HIS EXPERT OPINIONS 
AND THE BASES THEREOF. 
Prior to trial, counsel for Ms. Carrier took the 
deposition of Newell Knight, the accident reconstructionist 
designated by Pleasant Grove City. At the time of that 
deposition, counsel for Pro-Tech questioned Mr. Knight 
regarding his opinion of whether Smith entered the intersection 
clearly ahead of Ms. Carrier, and what that would mean in terms 
of right-of-way based on his understanding and experience with 
the Utah Traffic Code. (R. 1075, pp. 81 and 82) 
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During the latter portion of the trial in this matter, 
Ms. Carrier's counsel requested the Court to allow him to 
introduce testimony from the expert retained by Pleasant Grove, 
Newell Knight, by way of reading extensively from his cross-
examination of Mr. Knight in the pre-trial deposition. 
Pleasant Grove had elected not to have Mr. Knight testify on 
its behalf. Ms. Carrier's hope was to try and discredit Pro-
Tech's accident reconstruction expert by using portions of 
Newell Knight's cross-examination (Appellant's Brief, p. 28), 
without allowing Mr. Knight to testify regarding his own 
conclusions and opinions, as he had done during his 
deposition. (R. 1075, pp. 81 and 82) Ms. Carrier opened the 
door to Mr. Knight's testimony, but then complained that the 
door was opened. She introduces Mr. Knight's testimony into 
the trial, then complains his testimony is improper because it 
hurts her case, and now asserts that defendants improperly 
tried to "hide" Mr. Knight from the jury. It seems Ms. Carrier 
was having a difficult time making up her mind whether or not 
it was in her best interest to have Newell Knight testify. 
Now, with 2 0/2 0 hindsight, Ms. Carrier wishes for Mr. Knight's 
testimony to provide a basis for reversing the jury's verdict. 
Prior to Ms. Carrier's counsel calling Newell Knight, 
the Court informed counsel that it would be the defendants' 
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choice as to whether Newell would be allowed to take the stand 
as a witness. Pro-Tech's counsel indicated he would not agree 
to the reading of Newell's deposition unless he was called as a 
witness and took the stand. The Court ruled Mr. Knight would 
have to be called as a witness. (R. 2403-2404, 2439) 
With knowledge of this ruling by the Court, and with 
knowledge that Mr. Knight had testified in his deposition that 
it was his opinion Smith was in the intersection first and 
would therefore have the right-of-way, counsel for Ms. Carrier 
nevertheless chose to call Mr. Knight and introduce the cross-
examination from his deposition. Counsel for Pro-Tech then 
questioned Mr. Knight regarding his opinion of whether Smith 
entered the intersection first and what that meant in terms of 
right-of-way given his understanding and experience with the 
Utah Traffic Code. When Ms. Carrier's counsel objected, the 
court explained that it had granted examination outside the 
scope of either cross or direct throughout the trial, and since 
Mr. Knight was there available to testify, he did not feel it 
necessary to impose the formality of limiting his testimony 
only to Ms. Carrier's cross-examination in the deposition. 
Also, the court noted that Newell Knight had been called as an 
expert, duly qualified, and testified within the scope of that 
expertise. 
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Thus, where counsel for Pro-Tech was merely questioning 
Mr. Knight regarding the same opinions testified to in his 
deposition, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to 
allow it. 
Rule 3 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with 
the use of depositions in court proceedings. Subsection (a) 
(4) of that rule states as follows: 
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered 
in evidence by a party, an adverse party may 
require him to introduce any other part which 
ought in fairness to be considered with the part 
introduced, and any party may introduce any other 
parts. 
Further, Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence deals 
with an expert witness's opinion on the ultimate issue in a 
case, and states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (d), 
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because 
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by 
the trier of fact. 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corporation, 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990) : 
[T] he proper scope of cross-examination is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court 
and should not be disturbed absent a showing of 
abuse. 
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Id. at 923-924. (Citations omitted). See also, Rule 611(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding scope of cross-
examination. 
In the present case, after calling Mr. Knight to the 
stand, Ms. Carrier's counsel had Mr. Knight read extensive 
testimony from his deposition regarding calculations on which 
he based his opinion of whether Mr. Smith entered the subject 
intersection clearly ahead of Ms. Carrier. Under such 
circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to allow counsel for Pro-Tech Restoration to follow up 
with questioning regarding Mr. Knight's opinions, which he 
claimed were supported by the data, and which he had previously 
testified about in his deposition. It further was not an abuse 
of discretion for the trial court to allow Newell Knight to 
testify regarding the right-of-way between Ms. Carrier and Mr. 
Smith, based on his opinion that Mr. Smith entered the 
intersection clearly ahead of Ms. Carrier, and based on his 
understanding and experience with the Utah Traffic Code 
regarding right-of-way at intersections. Ms. Carrier's own 
expert accident reconstructionist had testified earlier 
regarding the right-of-way issue. (R. 1760) 
In Randle v. Allen, supra, the plaintiff asserted on 
appeal that defendant's accident reconstruction expert should 
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not have been permitted to testify as to who had the right-of-
way. 862 P. 2d at 1337. However, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that: 
In light of Haggin's [the proposed accident 
reconstruction expert's] extensive experience as 
a police officer investigating traffic accidents, 
it was not an abuse of discretion to allow him to 
testify as to which vehicle should have yielded 
the right-of-way at the intersection. 
Id. at 1337-38 (explanation added). 
Appellant's citation to Davidson v. Prince, 813 P. 2d 
1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P. 2d 651 (Utah 
1991), is not applicable in this case. In Davidson, Mr. Knight 
had been asked to testify regarding his opinion with respect to 
whether or not the defendant was "negligent." That differs 
significantly from the instant case, where Mr. Knight was asked 
to testify as to his opinion regarding right-of-way, based on 
his calculations as to who had entered the intersection first, 
and the applicable Utah statute regarding right-of-way. In 
Davidson, the Court found that Mr. Knight had been asked to 
give a "legal conclusion." Whereas, in the present case, Mr. 
Knight had been asked to give an opinion regarding an issue of 
fact, leading to the simple applicability of a Utah statute 
regarding the issue of right-of-way. Further, the Court of 
Appeals' decision in Davidson regarding Mr. Knight's testimony 
was actually based on the deference given to trial courts when 
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reviewing the admissibility of evidence at trial, recognizing 
the trial court's advantageous position with respect to that 
issue. 
In this case, Ms. Carrier had to be prepared to take the 
bitter with the sweet. By choosing to introduce testimony of 
Pleasant Grove's expert, Newell Knight, after Pleasant Grove 
had chosen not to call him as a witness, Ms. Carrier chose to 
take the risk that Mr. Knight would testify the same as in his 
pre-trial deposition regarding his conclusions and opinions, in 
addition to the bases for such. Since Ms. Carrier cannot show 
that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. 
Knight to be questioned and testify regarding his expert 
opinions, the trial court's judgment should not be disturbed by 
this Court on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and authorities this 
Court should affirm the judgment entered by the Court on the 
jury's verdict in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ > day of February, 1995. 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Pleksant Grove City 
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